Saturday, July 25, 2009

Gauging elevation -Anna Armstrong


A new study verifies the merit of using Global Positioning System (GPS) data to reduce uncertainty in measuring sea level rise. Most estimates of sea level rise over the past century are based on long tide-gauge records, which must be corrected for the vertical displacement of land from sedimentation and other causes. In the past, a variety of correction methods have been tried, yielding estimates with a range of one to three millimetres per year.

Guy Wöppelmann of the University of La Rochelle, France, and colleagues previously proposed that GPS data could potentially be used as a universal correction method for tide-gauge data. Now they have used GPS data collected from 227 global stations over a ten-year period to adjust global estimates of sea level rise. Their modified estimate of global mean sea level rise over the last century — 1.61 millimetres per year — is in good agreement with the most recent estimates made from altimetry and gravity observations. The scatter associated with regionally averaged trends is significantly reduced, however, when changes in land elevation are taken into account.

The authors say that their geodetic approach can be used to considerably improve estimates of sea level rise.

Nature Reports Climate Change
Published online: 16 July 2009 | doi:10.1038/climate.2009.68

The incredible shrinking venture capital--John Browning


Venture funding is declining quickly and is unlikely to bounce back. But less money means lower expectations — good news for smaller science start-ups, says John Browning.
The days when stock options put Ferraris into the car parks of start-ups are over, and venture capital is drying up. In the first quarter of 2009, US venture-capital investments in the life sciences fell 40% from the fourth quarter of 2008, in biotechnology they fell 46%, and in software 42%. Even investment in green technologies — such as those designed to improve energy efficiency — was down 84%, more than wiping out the 54% increase from 2007 to 2008.

This isn't necessarily all bad news. The venture-capital boom of the 1990s created expectations that many companies cannot meet. As the amount of venture capital shrinks, both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are rethinking some of their basic assumptions. Having less money might make companies healthier, given the reduced pressure to be a skyrocketing success and the increased flexibility for business strategy and growth. Although the conventional venture-capital model has best suited fast-growing IT or biotech companies, it could begin to suit science and technology start-ups aimed at smaller markets.

Venture capitalists usually look for companies that will grow quickly — as a rule of thumb, with sales of at least US$50 million within six years — and that can then be sold, either to a larger firm or on to the stock market. Without a sale, venture capitalists can't return profits to those who invested the money in the first place. The microelectronics and Internet booms of the 1990s and early 2000s provided both fast growth and sales; the lure of a Google-like financial cornucopia inspired a fivefold increase in the amount of capital in venture funds between 1996 and 2001. But more and bigger sales were needed to keep investors happy.
Risky business

This style of investing can build great companies. Think of Google, Intel, Apple, Cisco Systems and Genentech. Mercenary though it may be, the focus of creating a sellable company forces managers to make the most of their opportunities. Venture capitalists are also tolerant of risk: a typical fund would expect about a third of its investments to fail outright. But what venture capitalists can't tolerate is the merely average. They have a term for companies that reach, say, $10 million in sales and neither lose so much money that they go out of business, nor grab the markets to continue growing and fetch a high sale price. They call them the 'living dead'. Where many might see a nice little company — including biotech ventures whose names would be familiar to many — a venture capitalist sees mostly frustration. Today, with capital markets crunched and sales slow, more and more investments look as though they fall into this category.

Returns on venture-capital investments have sagged steadily since the Internet boom years. Now both venture capitalists and their investors are losing patience. After a 7% decline in 2007, the collective assets of US venture capitalists shrank by 24% in 2008, to $197 billion. The result was fewer investments, falling from $8 billion across 1,058 deals in the fourth quarter of 2007 to $3 billion for 549 deals in the first quarter of 2009 — the lowest amount of investment since 1997. Paul Kedrosky, a former venture capitalist turned industry commentator, predicts the money isn't coming back. He estimates that the venture-capital industry will settle down to about half the size it was in the early 2000s, or about the same as it was in the late 1990s.

In the face of such declines, some are eschewing outside investment altogether and financing companies with their own resources. In IT, the cost of starting a business has fallen dramatically; one US entrepreneur, Paula Conway, recently financed her travel website by selling cupcakes.

Others have been looking harder at 'angel financing', in which wealthy individuals put their own money into deals. These individuals still want a return on their investment, but they are more willing to take it as a stream of dividends from a company that has found a valuable niche, rather than as profit from the sale of the company. Although the amount of angel financing in the United States shrank by about 26% from 2007 to 2008, it was still about $19 billion for 2008, not far below traditional venture capital, according to a study by the Center for Venture Research, at the University of New Hampshire in Durham. What is more promising is that the money was spread across roughly the same number of deals in 2008 as in 2007: about 55,000.

Given the lacklustre returns of traditional investment strategies, venture capitalists are also looking to do more with less. Marc Andreessen, co-founder of Netscape Communications and a pillar of the Silicon Valley establishment, recently co-launched a venture firm that plans to invest as little as $50,000 per start-up — far less than the $3 million considered to be a minimum by many venture capitalists. Although it is early days, efforts such as this might reshape venture capitalism. Without the weight of Googlesque expectations on their shoulders, companies that might have joined the ranks of the living dead could start to look lively. A start-up focused on a non-blockbuster drug or diagnostic test might now find itself with an attractive niche market, garnering the attention of venture capitalists who would usually have avoided this type of limited-growth company.

Smaller investments will force entrepreneurs to work harder — no more plush offices or fridges stocked with designer fruit juice. But, because the returns demanded by investors are proportional to the amounts put in, smaller investments also reduce the pressure on companies and allow them to become more flexible in their business strategies. And that is what entrepreneurship needs most.
Source www.nature.com

The Descent of Finance -by Niall Ferguson


When today’s great crisis ends, the U.S. financial system will be a shadow of its former self, but America will be stronger than ever. History shows that money and power don’t always go hand in hand.

--
If the ascent of modern finance began in the 1980s, with “liar’s poker” on Wall Street and the City of London’s Big Bang, it ended on September 15, 2008—the day Lehman Brothers Holdings went bankrupt. Seven years on, 9/15 supplanted 9/11 as the costliest day in Wall Street’s history.

Lehman Brothers’ demise was one of seven events that, in the space of just 19 days, signaled the end of an epoch. The first, on September 7, was the nationalization of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). On September 14 Bank of America announced that it would buy Merrill Lynch. On September 16 a money market fund, Reserve Primary, broke the buck—that is, its net asset value dropped below $1 per share—because of losses on the unsecured commercial paper it had bought from Lehman. That same day the Federal Reserve agreed to give AIG $85 billion to avoid a lethal chain reaction if the insurance giant couldn’t meet its obligations on the credit default swaps it had sold to banks. Nationalization in this case took the form of a warrant to the Federal Reserve for 79.9% of the company’s equity. On September 22 the investment bank became an extinct species when Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted themselves into bank holding companies. Finally, on September 25, Washington Mutual Bank was seized by the Office of Thrift Supervision and placed into the receivership of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—marking the biggest bank failure in America’s history.

Although the crisis began nearly two years ago, September 2008 was the month American finance fell off a cliff. What will be the long-term impact on the U.S. economy and the global financial system?
From Crisis to Breakdown

Imagine the worst-case scenario: The current recession turns out to be another great depression. The one that began in August 1929 lasted 43 months, according to the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research. However, the first great depression, which only historians now remember, began with the Panic of 1873 and lingered for 65 months. If the U.S. economy keeps shrinking that long, there won’t be a sustained recovery until after May 2013.

Fast-forward to 2013. The government-owned Citibank of America, formed by the forced merger and nationalization of the United States’ two biggest banks, now dominates retail banking. The number of U.S. banks has fallen by half, from 8,534 in 2007. There are just 3,000 hedge funds all over the world—less than a third of the precrisis total. The regulatory framework that was imposed by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner in the previous four years has completely changed the financial landscape. With new restrictions on executive compensation, bank capitalization, and derivatives trading, retail banking has become more like a public utility. Even nonbank entities like hedge funds and insurance companies have to operate under the unsleeping eye of the new Financial Authority for the Regulation of Systemic Institutions (FARSI).

Despite FARSI’s extensive powers, the U.S. government is still grappling with the fiscal legacy of the crisis. The federal debt is now around $20 trillion—$3 trillion higher than the Obama administration forecast in its 2009 budget. The top income tax rate is 45%. The S&P 500 is down to 418, where it was in December 1991—a decline comparable to that between 1929 and 1934. The United States, it appears, is stuck in the middle of its own lost decade, with real GDP having grown by barely 1% per annum since 2010.

We started out calling it the Subprime Crisis. It quickly became the Credit Crunch and then the Global Financial Crisis. By 2013 a new name has stuck: the Breakdown.

Copyright © 2009 Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation. All rights reserved.